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I. INTRODUCTION
The rights and responsibilities associated with the "family" have,
across the ages, changed along with the social, religious, and economic
conditions of the times. Among the aspects of the family relationship
that have only recently come to be recognized by the law is the right of
an unwed father to establish a relationship or seek custody of his chil-
dren born out of wedlock. As this Note discusses, further progress
must yet be made.
A. Factual History of Scovell and Babb
In September of 1992, Ronald A. Scovell, then still a high school
student, met Jessica M. Babb.' The two worked together at a local
fast food restaurant in Virginia, Minnesota, and over the course of sev-
eral months came to be friends.2
During the holiday season of 1992, Scovell's relationship with his
gir]friend began to disintegrate, and in early 1993 his relationship
with Babb began to strengthen.3 Because Scovell did not own a car,
Ms. Babb frequently transported Scovell to or from work. On one such
occasion, Scovell's mother invited Babb to spend the night, so that she
would not have to drive home late that night through the severe Min-
nesota winter weather.4 Babb was allowed to sleep in Scovell's bed-
1. Brief for Petitioner at 1-2, Scovell v. Scheele (Lancaster County Dist. Ct. July 18,
1994)(No. 510-145).
2. Id. at 2. The interaction of Scovell and Babb included Babb's training of Scovell
while he was a new employee, working regularly together on overlapping shifts,
and holiday-season volunteer work for the Salvation Army. Id.
3. Id. at 2-3.
4. Id. at 3. Ms. Babb did not live in Virginia, Minnesota, where she worked and
attended classes at a community college. She lived with her parents in Cook,
Minnesota, 48 miles from Virginia, and commuted each day.
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room. When Babb spent the night again, only a few days later, the
two engaged in sexual relations.5 According to both, they continued to
engage in sex until early April of 1993. Both also testified at the time
of trial in this case that the sexual relations were at all times
consensual. 6
In early May, Babb confided to Scovell's mother that she was preg-
nant and arranged to meet Scovell to convey that news. When the two
met on May 8, 1993, Scovell questioned the reliability of Babb's home
pregnancy test and asked her to confirm her condition with a doctor. 7
Scovell's doubt led to an argument between the two and ultimately
resulted in Babb stating that she intended to seek an abortion.8
Although Scovell urged her to consider allowing him to have custody
of the child, he took no actions to provide support for Babb or the ex-
pected child, nor did he have any contact with Babb until January 8,
1994.9
Jessica Babb contacted an attorney in Lincoln, who recommended
she place the child for adoption. In late November, 1993, Babb met
with Monty and Julie Scheele to tell them that she had selected them
5. Id.; Brief for Respondents at 4, Scovell v. Scheele (Lancaster County Dist. Ct.
July 18, 1994)(No. 510-145).
6. Brief for Respondents at 4, Scovell v. Scheele (Lancaster County Dist. Ct. July 18,
1994)(No. 510-145). In spite of the trial testimony from Babb that the sexual
encounters were consensual, she had reported to her co-workers in Virginia, to
her friends developed upon relocation to the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, to
her attorney, and to the Nebraska State Legislature that she had been the victim
of date rape. Id.
7. Brief for Petitioner at 4-5, Scovell v. Scheele (Lancaster County Dist. Ct. July 18,
1994)(No. 510-145); Brief for Respondents at 4, Scovell v. Scheele (Lancaster
County Dist. Ct. July 18, 1994)(No. 510-145).
8. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Scovell v. Scheele (Lancaster County Dist. Ct. July 18,
1994)(No. 510-145); Brief for Respondents at 4, Scovell v. Scheele (Lancaster
County Dist. Ct. July 18, 1994)(No. 510-145).
9. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Scovell v. Scheele (Lancaster County Dist. Ct. July 18,
1994)(No. 510-145); Brief for Respondents at 4, Scovell v. Scheele (Lancaster
County Dist. Ct. July 18, 1994)(No. 510-145). Scovell explains this lack of contact
on his July, 1993 orders from the Minnesota Army National Guard to attend
training in Kentucky, Babb's secret move from Minnesota to Nebraska in August
of 1993, and his belief that she intended to abort the child. Brief for Petitioner at
6, 9, Scovell v. Scheele (Lancaster County Dist. Ct. July 18, 1994)(No. 510-145).
Given that the Supreme Court and numerous inferior courts have held that
neither husbands nor lovers have any authority to prevent an abortion and that
such a decision is for the woman alone to make, Scovell's last enumerated expla-
nation for his failure to make contact is, if not defensible, at least understanda-
ble. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976)(stating
that a woman may unilaterally choose abortion over childbirth, as she must phys-
ically bear the child); Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339, 342 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1973)(holding that a putative father has no right to enjoin the natural mother
from terminating the pregnancy).
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to be the adoptive parents of her child.1o On December 17, Jessica
Babb gave birth to Jorie Lyn Babb. On December 19, pursuant to a
valid relinquishment signed by Jessica Babb,"1 Monty and Julie
Scheele were given custody of Jorie Lyn.
On January 8, 1994, Babb contacted Scovell in Minnesota, telling
him that she had not aborted her pregnancy, that she had delivered a
baby girl on December 17, 1993, and that she had relinquished the
baby to an adoptive couple.12 On January 12, 1994, Scovell filed a
Notice of Intent to Claim Paternity with the Department of Social
Services as required by Nebraska law.1S On February 22, 1994,
Scovell filed a habeas corpus action seeking custody of Jorie Lyn.14
B. The Trial: Scovell v. Scheele
In his petition, Ronald Scovell challenged Nebraska's requirement
that in order to preserve his parental rights to his child born out of
wedlock he must file a Notice of Intent to Claim Paternity with the
Nebraska Department of Social Services within five days after the
birth of the child. Scovell claimed the requirement was violative of
both the due process and equal protection guarantees of the United
10. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Scovell v. Scheele (Lancaster County Dist. Ct. July 18,
1994)(No. 510-145).
11. See infra note 14, regarding Babb's challenge of the validity of the
relinquishment.
12. Brief for Petitioner at 9, Scovell v. Scheele (Lancaster County Dist. Ct. July 18,
1994)(No. 510-145).
13. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104.02 (Reissue 1988). See infra notes 204-29, 279-94 and
accompanying text for further discussion of this statute.
14. Brief for Respondents at 1, Scovell v. Scheele (Lancaster County Dist. Ct. July 18,
1994)(No. 510-145). The Nebraska Supreme Court has previously held: "habeas
corpus is an appropriate action to test the legality of custody and best interests of
a minor, including the rights of fathers of children born out of wedlock."
Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, Inc., 222 Neb. 574, 576, 385 N.W.2d
448, 450 (1986Xciting Christopherson v. Christopherson, 177 Neb. 414, 417, 129
N.W.2d 113, 115 (1964)); In re Schwartzkopf, 149 Neb. 460, 467, 31 N.W.2d 294,
298 (1948).
Ms. Babb had, prior to Scovell's filing of this action, filed her own habeas
corpus action alleging that she had lacked the mental capacity to sign or under-
stand the relinquishment, and that she had executed the relinquishment under
extreme duress and coercion. Babb v. Scheele, No. 510-221 (Lancaster County
Dist. Ct. May 25, 1994)(order denying writ of habeas corpus).
In denying Babb's claim, the court found:
The evidence shows that the petitioner is an intelligent, independent
and self-reliant young woman; that she knew what she was doing, made
her decision independently and without influence from any other party,
and had intended to give up her baby all along, at least until she re-
turned to her home in Minnesota and finally reported her pregnancy and
resulting birth to her mother.
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States Constitution.15 He further alleged that, because he had not
relinquished his parental rights to Jorie Lyn, he was entitled to
custody.16
In his order, Judge William Blue held that the Nebraska laws were
constitutional as applied to Scovell and cited Scovell's "completely ir-
responsible" behavior in making his decision.17 Judge Blue specifi-
cally noted that Scovell made no offers to assume responsibility for
Babb's medical bills, made no offer to support the baby upon its birth,
made no inquiries regarding Babb's whereabouts after their May 8,
1993 meeting, and made no effort to comply with Nebraska's statutory
requirements, despite his opportunity and ability to do all of these
things.s Blue further ordered a "best interest" hearing to be held on
July 26, 1994, at which time he determined that Jorie Lyn's best inter-
ests would be served by the Scheeles' continued custody.
C. Scope of this Note
This Note will chronicle the development of putative fathers' rights
in the law, as recognized in recent Supreme Court cases 19 and synthe-
size those varied holdings into the Supreme Court's current and prob-
able future position.20 It will analyze how these holdings have been
applied in recent state court decisions 2l and discuss the development
of Nebraska's statutory law22 and case law on this topic. 23 This Note
will also analyze how Nebraska's law conforms with or violates the
standards set by the Supreme Court and other state courts.2 4 Finally,
it recommends changes that should be made to Nebraska law as a
means of recognizing the further development of fathers' rights while
at the same time maintaining the state's interests in the adoption
process. 25
15. Scovell v. Scheele, 510-145 (Lancaster County Dist. Ct. July 18, 1994)(order de-
nying writ of habeas corpus).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See infra notes 48-163 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 164-69 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 170-203 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 204-29 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 230-78 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 279-322 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 279-322 and accompanying text.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF
THE LAW
A. Overview of Putative Fathers' Rights
Roman adoption law is the acknowledged root of American adop-
tion statutes.2 6 The thrust of Roman adoption law was to benefit the
adopting families in terms of creating and continuing the family
name.2 7 Up until 291 A.D., only men were allowed to adopt.28
English law recognized and authorized bastardy proceedings as
early as 1576 in order to relieve the public of its duty to support illegit-
imate children.2 9 At common law, a child born out of wedlock was
held to be filius nullius, the child of no one, or filius populi, the child of
the people.30 The common law did not recognize adoption or custody
determinations as we know them today. Since Roman times, children
had been treated as a chattel of the father to be treated or traded as
the father saw fit.31 Early in the 17th century, children were fre-
quently "bound out" to other families.3 2 Many such children were or-
phans and some were treated well in this situation, but the majority
were exploited for their cheap labor.3 3 In fact, even into the middle of
the 19th century, parents often placed their children in distant homes
with complete strangers.3 4 The emphasis on the economic or property
26. John Francis Brosnan, The Law of Adoption, 22 CoLuM. L. REv. 332 (1922); Robin
DuRocher, Balancing Competing Interests in Post-Placement Adoption Custody
Disputes, 15 J. LEGAL MVED. 305 (1994); Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Back-
ground of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAsL L. 443, 443 (1972).
27. Leo Albert Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VmND. L. REv.
743, 745 (1956); Presser, supra note 26, at 446.
28. Brosnan, supra note 26, at 333.
29. Under the Poor Law Act of 1576, each parish was authorized to impose a charge
upon the parents of a child in order to provide for its support. KENNETH M. DA-
VIDSON ET AL., SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 310 (1974).
30. ScHouLER, A TREATISE ON TE LAW OF Doims'nc RELATIONS, 408-09 (2d ed.
1874), cited in William Weston, Putative Fathers' Rights to Custody-A Rocky
Road At Best, 10 WHITTIER L. REv. 683, 685 (1989).
31. Under the Roman law doctrine of patria potestas, the father had absolute author-
ity. The father was given authority over all aspects of the child including the
child's life. A. HARALAI-s, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY CASES 2, § 1.02 (1983).
See also, Weston, supra note 30, at 686 (mother's first rights came in 1883).
32. Presser, supra note 26, at 458.
33. Presser, supra note 26, at 459. "No legal regulations existed to control the whole-
sale distribution of children to uninvestigated homes where they were used as
cheap labor." Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Adoption Practice, Issues, and Laws 1958-
1983, 17 FAm. L.Q. 173, 176 (1983), cited in DuRocher, supra note 26, at n.27.
34. Presser, supra note 26, at 460. That is not to say, however, that such was true in
every case. In fact, numerous parents of "bound out" children registered com-
plaints to the courts regarding their children's ill treatment at the hands of their
custodial keepers. Yasuhide Kawashima, Adoption in Early America, 20 J. FAAL
LAw 677, 685 (1981-82).
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value of children worsened to such a degree that children were often
advertised, sold, or arbitrarily given away.35
The State of Massachusetts passed the first adoption statutes to
combine legislative rules for the adoption procedure with legislation
regarding the welfare of the children.36 In an attempt to protect the
potential adoptee (the child), the statute created strict requirements
for parental qualification, among them: 1) both a husband and wife
had to join in the petition for adoption; 2) the judge hearing the peti-
tion had to be satisfied that the potential adopting parents were of
"sufficient ability" to raise the child; 3) all legal rights and obligations
concerning the child had to be surrendered by the biological parents;
and 4) the biological parents had to provide written consent for the
adoption.37 The Massachusetts statute was used as a model by other
state legislatures, and, eventually, all fifty states and the District of
Columbia enacted their own adoption statutes. 38
Because of the property-like treatment of children, and the recog-
nition that the father was the owner of that property, custody was
generally awarded to the father when such a dispute did arise.39
However, Lord Talfourd's Act of 183940 allowed courts of equity to
award custody of children of tender years to the mother.4' In 1885,
the Guardianship of Infants Act of 188542 elevated the mother to
equal footing with the father in all custody disputes. Further, the is-
sue of child welfare came to be recognized as being relevant to child
custody litigation at this time.43
Because of the rising concern for the welfare of the child, the pre-
sumption of equality between the mother and father soon gave way to
the presumption that the child needed the "care, love and discipline"
35. Howe, supra note 33, at 176; Presser, supra note 26, at 460.
36. Presser, supra note 26, at 465.
37. Presser, supra note 26, at 465. See also Janet Hopkins Dickson, The Emerging
Rights of Adoptive Parents: Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REv. 917, 924
(1991)(identifying welfare of the child and qualifications of adopters as the main
concerns of the Massachusetts' statute).
38. Dickson, supra note 37, at 924.
39. MFL R. RomAN & WnaIas H. HADDAD, Tim DIsPosABLE PAimNT 27 (1978).
40. 2 and 3 Vict. Stat., ch. 54 (1839), cited in Weston, supra note 30, at 688.
41. The tender years doctrine, in essence, presumed that a child under the age of six
or seven was best protected by placement with the mother. The doctrine is gener-
ally traced to the American case of Helms v. Franciscus, 2 Bland Ch. 544 (Md. 1
1830), which held that a young child needed the nurture and protection that an
"affectionate mother" would provide. Weston, supra note 30, at 689 n.39. "In
custody law, the 'tender years doctrine' has lost ground and is rejected or rele-
gated to a role of 'tiebreaker' in most states." Doris Jonas Freed & Timothy B.
Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 19 Fm. L.Q. 331, 401
(1986).
42. 40 and 50 Vict. Stat., ch. 27 (1886), cited in Weston, supra note 30, at 689 n.40.
43. Roman & Haddad, supra note 39, at 29-32. See also Weston, supra note 30, at
689 (mother and father on equal footing in custody dispute).
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that a mother, but not a father, would provide. 44 This maternal pref-
erence doctrine dominated custody litigation for nearly 75 years and
was reinforced by society's determination to view people in terms of
roles, rather than as individuals.45 It was not until society began to
view each person, each case, individually that the courts began to in-
sist on a neutral and objective determination in custody disputes.46
While fathers eventually gained equal footing in custody disputes for
their legitimate children, fathers were still at a decided disadvantage
when seeking custody of a child born out of wedlock. Men who had
fathered children outside the sanctity of a marital relationship were
presumed to be uninterested in such children; were presumed to have
no desire to provide care for such children; were presumed to have no
desire to seek custody of such children; and were presumed to have no
capacity to love such children.47
The following Section discusses how the United States Supreme
Court has sought to destroy those presumptions in the law, in order to
preserve the rights of the putative father, while not abridging the
rights of the other parties or the interests of the state.
B. U.S. Supreme Court Decisions
1. Stanley v. Illinois: Recognizing an Unwed Father's Rights
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that citi-
zens of this great Union have certain personal freedoms with which
the state may not interfere.48 It was not until 1972, however, that the
Court recognized that an unwed father had a constitutionally pro-
44. Ullman v. Ullman, 135 N.Y.S. 1080, 1083 (1912). See also Weston, supra note 30,
at 690.
45. Weston, supra note 30, at 690.
46. See, for example, Boroff v. Boroff, 197 Neb. 641, 250 N.W.2d 613, 616-17 (1977),
where the court cited and followed the Nebraska statute which provided that the
court shall not give preference to either parent based on the sex of the parent and
that no presumption shall exist that either parent is more fit to have custody of
the child than the other.
47. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 653 n.5, 655 nn.6-7, 656 n.8 (1972).
48. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), where the court said:
While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty
thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of
the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it de-
notes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of
life, to acquire useful knowledge to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience,
and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Id. at 399. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)(right of privacy
in marital relationship); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)(right of mar-
riage and procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)(right of
parents to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control).
1995]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
tected interest in the "companionship, care, custody, and management
of his ... children."49
In Stanley v. Illinois,5O Joan and Peter Stanley lived together for
18 years raising their three children.51 When Joan Stanley died, be-
cause Joan and Peter had been unmarried, Illinois law mandated that
the Stanley children be declared wards of the state.52 After the state-
instituted dependency proceeding, which declared the Stanley chil-
dren wards of the state and placed them with court-appointed guardi-
ans, Peter Stanley appealed, claiming he had been denied an
opportunity to establish that he was a fit parent, i.e., he had been de-
nied due process of law.53 Stanley further claimed that since neither
married fathers nor unwed mothers may be deprived custody of their
children without a showing of parental unfitness, he had been denied
equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.54 While recognizing that Stanley had not been shown to be un-
fit, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected his claims, holding that the
single fact that he had not been married to the children's mother made
him presumptively unfit.55 His actual fitness or unfitness, the court
held, was irrelevant.56
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that "as a matter of due pro-
cess of law, Stanley was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent
before his children were taken from him."57 In reaching its decision,
the Court did not challenge the state's duty to protect minor chil-
dren.58 In fact, the Court stated the "establishment of prompt effica-
cious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state
interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication."59 How-
ever, the Court pointed out that "if Stanley is a fit father, the State
spites its own articulated goals when it needlessly separates him from
his family."60 In addressing Stanley's due process claim, Mr. Justice
White concluded: "Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and
easier then individualized determination."61 Because the "Constitu-
tion recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency,"62 White rea-
soned, and because the particular presumption employed by the State
49. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
50. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
51. Id. at 646.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 646-47.
56. Id. at 647.
57. Id. at 649.
58. Id. at 649-50.
59. Id. at 656.
60. Id. at 652-53.
61. Id. at 656-57.
62. Id. at 656.
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of Illinois in this case foreclosed the opportunity to be heard when
faced with the loss of cognizable and substantial interests,63 it must
be struck down.64 The Court further found that because the Constitu-
tion guarantees that all parents are entitled to a hearing of fitness
before their children are removed from their custody, the Illinois stat-
ute denying Stanley such a hearing necessarily also violated the
Equal Protection Clause.65
2. Quilloin v. Walcott: No Responsibility or Relationship Equals
No Rights
Although the Court's decision in Stanley made it clear that an un-
wed father had constitutionally protected rights in his children, the
extent of those rights was still unclear.66 The case Quilloin v.
Walcott67 began to help define the boundaries of a putative father's
rights. Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous court, held that an
unwed father who had "never shouldered any significant responsibil-
ity with respect to the daily supervision, education, protection, or care
of the child,"6s and who was not seeking custody of the child, but only
63. Id. at 652.
64. Id. at 657.
65. Id. at 658. For further discussion of Stanley, see Joan E. Handler, Note, The
Impact of Stanley v. Illinois on Custody Proceedings for Illegitimate Children:
Procedural Parity for the Putative Father?, 3 N.Y.U. L. Rxv. Aln Soc. CHANGE 31
(1973); Wendy V. Larsen, Note, Constitutional Law-Stanley v. Illinois: New
Rights for Putative Fathers, 21 DEPA L L. REv. 1036 (1972); Benjamin J. Reeves,
Comment, Protecting the Putative Father's Rights After Stanley v. Illinois:
Problems in Implementation, 13 J. FAm. L. 115 (1973-74).
66. In Stanley, the Court stated that it was protecting the private interests of a man
"in the children he has sired and raised." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
(1972). However, the Court also recommended service by publication so that un-
known fathers would also have the opportunity to assert their interests. Id. at
657 n.9.
Those facially inconsistent provisions left many states, which were responding
to Stanley by amending their adoption statutes, in a state of confusion. Some
states interpreted Stanley to extend to all biological fathers. These states en-
acted legislation that provided for actual notice of pending adoption proceedings
via personal service or registered mail for fathers whose identity and location was
known and provided notice by publication for all others. On the other hand, some
states interpreted it more narrowly. These states placed the burden on the father
to take actions to protect his interests in any children he may have conceived.
New York (and Nebraska and Utah) requires that a man, who suspects he may
have contributed to the conception of a child, sign a state registry indicating the
woman's name. If the named woman does indeed give birth and attempts to
place the child for adoption, the registered father will be notified, giving him the
opportunity to contest the procedure. 2 Horr H. CLARKE, JR., ThE LAw OF Do-
AmSTiO RELAnoNS iN mx UNITED STATEs, § 21.2, at 574-75 (1987). See infra,
notes 204-29 and accompanying text for discussion of the development of Ne-
braska adoption law.
67. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
68. Id. at 256.
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seeking to prevent the child's adoption by his stepfather, could not use
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses to resurrect rights he
had relinquished through inaction and irresponsibility.69
In December of 1964, Ardell Williams gave birth to a child fathered
by Leon Quilloin.70 The two never married each other, never estab-
lished a home together, and the child never lived with Quilloin.71 In
1967, Williams married Randall Walcott; in 1969, the child began to
live with the Walcotts;72 and in 1976, the mother consented to adop-
tion of the child by her husband.73 Quilloin attempted to block the
adoption and secure visitation rights, but he did not seek custody and
did not object to the child remaining with the Walcotts.74 All of these
matters were consolidated for trial to allow "the biological father.., a
right to be heard with respect to any issue or other thing upon which
he desire[s] to be heard, including his fitness as a parent."75 Despite
finding that Quilloin was a fit parent and that he had not abandoned
his child, the trial court granted the adoption, finding it was in the
child's "best interests."76
Quilloin appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court, claiming that
Georgia law, which provided that both parents must consent to the
adoption of a child born in wedlock,77 while only the consent of the
mother was required for the adoption of a child born out of wedlock,78
violated his constitutional rights of due process and equal protection.
Emphasizing the state interests involved, the fact that the pending
adoption would cement the bonds of an already existing family unit,
and the fact that Quilloin had never been a part of the child's family
unit, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.79
Upon his appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Quilloin ar-
gued that, absent a finding of unfitness, the denial of his right to exer-
cise an absolute veto over the adoption of his child was violative of his
rights of due process and equal protection.SO Although the Walcotts
asserted that Quilloin lost any constitutionally protected interest by
69. Id. at 255-56.
70. Id. at 247.
71. Id.
72. The child previously lived with its maternal grandmother. Id. at n.1.
73. Id. at 247.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 250 (quoting In re Randall Walcott, No. 8466, App. 70, (Ga. Super. Ct. July
12, 1976)).
76. Id. at 247, 251.
77. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 74-403(1), (2) (1975).
78. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(3) (1975).
79. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 252 (1978). See Quilloin v. Walcott, 232 S.E.2d
246 (Ga. 1977).
80. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,253 (1978). The equal protection claim was not
addressed by the Court, as it was not properly presented in Quilloin's jurisdic-
tional statement. Id. at n.13.
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his failure to legitimize the child sometime during the prior eleven
years, the Court refused to rest its decision on that fact, because Quil-
loin was unaware of the legitimization process. 81 The Court instead
noted the special circumstances of the case.8 2 It recognized that the
Due Process Clause would undoubtedly be offended if a state were to
break up an existing natural family, with no showing of unfitness,
simply becaise to do so would be, in the estimation of the court, in the
children's best interests.8 3 The Court continued, however, distin-
guishing the case at hand from the hypothetical one. Justice Marshall
noted that Quilloin had never had nor sought custody of the child; the
adoption would recognize and legitimize an already existing family
unit; and all parties involved, save Quilloin, desired that result.84
Noting these distinguishing facts, Justice Marshall concluded:
"Under any standard of review, the state was not foreclosed from rec-
ognizing this difference in the extent of commitment to the welfare of
the child."85
3. Caban v. Mohammed: Similarly Situated, Unwed Parents
Just one year after announcing the Quilloin decision, the Court
had the opportunity to further define the rights of putative fathers in
Caban v. Mohammed.86 Under New York adoption law, an unwed
mother could unilaterally block the adoption of her child by simply
withholding her consent.8 7 The unwed father, on the other hand, had
no such authority to block an adoption.88 The only way for an unwed
father to prevent the termination of his parental rights was by show-
ing that the adoption was not in the child's best interests.8 9
Abdiel Caban and Maria Mohammed lived together in New York
City for over five years. Although the two never legally married,90
they held themselves out as husband and wife.91 During this period of
cohabitation, the two conceived and raised two children.92 Caban and
81. Id. at 254.
82. Id. at 255.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 256. For further discussion of Quilloin, see Nancy A. Anstaeet, Comment,
Parental Rights: The Putative Father, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 174 (1978); Steven E.
Davis, Comment, Illegitimacy and the Rights of Unwed Fathers in Adoption Pro-
ceedings After Quilloin v. Walcott, 12 J. MsHALL PRAc. ANm PRoc. 383 (1979).
86. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
87. Id. at 386; N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 111(c) (McKinney 1977).
88. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 386-87 (1979); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 111(d)
(McKinney 1977).
89. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 386-87 (1979).
90. Id. at 382. Caban was, in fact, married to another woman the entire time but was
separated from her while living with Mohammed. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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Mohammed both contributed to the support of the family, until Mo-
hammed took the children from Caban and married another man.93
Despite Mohammed's marriage, Caban was able to maintain contact
with his children each weekend for the next nine months, until their
maternal grandmother took them to Puerto Rico. 94 Caban went to Pu-
erto Rico, brought the children back to New York, then refused to sur-
render custody to Mohammed.95 The Mohammeds were granted
custody of the children and then petitioned the court for adoption.96
Caban cross-petitioned for adoption,97 but the trial court granted the
Mohammeds' petition for adoption.98 The New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, affirmed,99 and the New York Court of Appeals
dismissed Caban's appeal.100
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Caban claimed that the distinc-
tion made between unwed fathers and other parents in New York
adoption law violated the Equal Protection Clause.101 He further
claimed that his substantive due process rights were violated as he
had never been found to be an unfit parent.' 02
The Court's sharply divided decision reversing the New York
courts' decisions made it plainly apparent that the issue of putative
fathers' rights was far from settled.103 In assessing Caban's equal
protection claim, Justice Powell noted: "Gender-based distinctions
'must serve important governmental objectives and must be substan-
tially related to achievement of those objectives' in order to withstand
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 383.
96. Id. Caban and his new wife were given visitation rights. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See In re David A.C., 391 N.Y.S.2d 208 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
100. See In re David A.C., 372 N.E.2d 42 (N.Y. 1977).
101. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 385 (1979).
102. Id. The majority opinion noted: "As the appellant was given due notice and was
permitted to participate as a party in the adoption proceedings, he does not con-
tend that he was denied procedural due process held to be requisite in Stan-
ley. . . ." Id. at 385 n.3 (citation omitted). When the Court ruled that the
challenged statutory scheme was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause, it then had no occasion to express its "view as to whether a state is consti-
tutionally barred from ordering adoption in the absence of a determination that
the parent whose rights are being terminated is unfit." Id. at 394 n.16. Thus, the
substantive due process claim was neither addressed nor decided. Id.
103. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). In the 5-4 decision, Justice Pow-
ell delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Brennan, White, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun. Id. at 381. Justice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion. Id.
at 394-401 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also filed a dissenting opin-
ion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 401-17 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
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judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause."10 4 In response
to the Mohamneds' first assertion that the distinction made under
New York law is justified because a natural mother bears a closer re-
lationship to her child than a natural father does, the Court disagreed,
stating that "an unwed father may have a relationship with his chil-
dren fully comparable to that of the mother."'10 5 As such, the majority
struck down the broad, gender-based distinction.106
The Mohammeds further asserted that the distinction was sub-
stantially related to the state interest of promoting the adoption of
illegitimate children.07 The majority fully recognized that such a
state interest was, indeed, "important.1os It rejected, however, the
means used to achieve that important end.109 For such a classifica-
tion to stand, the Court said, it "must be reasonable, not arbitrary,
and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and sub-
stantial relation to the object of the legislation.... ."110 The majority
then found that the challenged statute did not meet this test, as its
effect was to discriminate against all unwed fathers, even those who
"have manifested a significant paternal interest in the child."'
104. Id. at 388 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)). Craig was the first
case in which a majority of Justices agreed upon a definition for the "intermediate
scrutiny" standard of review in gender discrimination cases. JESSE CHOPER ET
AL,., TRE SuPREAm CoURT: TRENDS An DavELoPENTs 1978-79, at 24-25 (Doro-
thy Opperman ed., National Practice Institute 1979).
105. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 (1979).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 391.
109.
110.
111.
Id.
Id. (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)).
Id. at 394. In this last quote it becomes clear that the majority in Caban, as it did
in Stanley and Quilloin, looked to an existing and substantial relationship be-
tween father and children in order to determine what rights, if any, the putative
father held. See id. at 391-93. Further, in his dissent, Justice Stevens asserted
that under his reading of the majority's opinion, neither the holding nor the rea-
soning advanced in that opinion would affect the adoption of an infant. Id. at 416
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Moreover, the majority specifically noted that it would
not express an opinion regarding whether a statutory scheme, as presented in
this case, would pass constitutional scrutiny in the case of newborn adoptions.
Id. at 392 n.11.
For further discussion of Caban, see Howard M. Klein, Comment, An Analysis
of the Unwed Father's Adoption Rights in Light of Caban v. Mohammed: A Foun-
dation in Federal Law for a Necessary Redrafting of the Pennsylvania Adoption
Act, 25 Vm.. L. Rzy. 317 (1979-1980); Stephen Jerry Sturgill, Note, Unwed Fa-
ther has Equal Protection Right to Consent-Caban v. Mohammed, 1979 B.Y.U. L.
Rav. 987; John T. Wright, Comment, Caban v. Mohammed: Extending the Rights
of Unwed Fathers, 46 BROOK. L. REv. 95 (1979).
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4. Lehr v. Robertson: Grasping an Opportunity to Retain
Rights-The Supreme Court Only Helps Those Who
Help Themselves
Justice Stevens, who had authored one of the two Caban dissents,
wrote the majority decision for a still divided Court in Lehr v. Robert-
son.112 In Lehr, the Court held that "the mere existence of a biological
link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection11s as com-
pared to a relationship where the unwed father has demonstrated
"full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood."114 After
enunciating this rule, the Court emphasized that Lehr "never had any
significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship,"115 nor did he
ever "seek to establish a legal tie until after she (his illegitimate child)
was two years old."116
Jonathon Lehr and Lorraine Robertson began living together in
1974, and remained together until the birth of their child in November
of 1976.117 Throughout the pregnancy and after the child's birth, Lor-
raine acknowledged to all that Lehr was the father, and while Lor-
raine was in the hospital, Lehr visited every day.118 However, upon
her discharge from the hospital and until August of 1978, Lorraine
concealed her whereabouts from Lehr.19 When Lehr finally located
Lorraine and their child, she was already married to another man.120
Upon threatened legal action from Lehr to gain visitation rights, the
Robertsons commenced the adoption action contested here.121
In response to Stanley and Caban, the State of New York had insti-
tuted a putative father registry.122 The State likewise had developed
112. 463 U.S. 248 (1983). In Lehr, Justices Powell and Brennan, who had been with
the majority in Caban, were convinced to change positions and join Justice Ste-
vens in denying the fathers' rights. Justice O'Connor replaced Justice Stewart,
maintaining his position aligned with Stevens. This left Justices White, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun as the lone advocates of fathers' rights. See id.
113. Id. at 261.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 262.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 250, 268. The facts of Lehr are somewhat in dispute. The majority's recita-
tion of facts is quite brief and, according to the dissenters, biased. Id. at 270-71
(White, J., dissenting). In fact, Justice White accusationally states that the ma-
jority's version of the facts "obviously does not tell the whole story." Id- at 271.
White further complained that the Court "cannot fairly make a judgment based
on the quality or substance of a relationship without a complete and developed
factual record." Id.
118. Id. at 269.
119. Id.
120. Id. Lorraine married Richard Robertson eight months after the birth of Lebr's
child. Id. at 250.
121. Id. at 269.
122. Id. at 250 n.4; N.Y. Soc. SERV. § 372-C (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983). The statute
provided:
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a scheme whereby certain classes of unwed fathers were entitled to
notice of any adoption involving their children.123 Because Lehr fell
into none of the statutory classifications, he was not given notice of the
pending adoption proceedings.124 The judge hearing the adoption pro-
ceeding granted the adoption in favor of the Robertsons. In addition,
at the request of the Robertsons, the judge dismissed Lebr's paternity
petition, stating that the adoption had terminated Lehr's parental
rights and, therefore, his standing. 125
(1) The department shall establish a putative father registry which
shall record the names and addresses of... any person who has filed
with the registry before or after the birth of a child out-of-wedlock, a
notice of intent to claim paternity of the child ....
(2) A person filing a notice of intent to claim paternity of a child... shall
include therein his current address and shall notify the registry of any
change of address pursuant to procedures prescribed by regulations of
the department.
(3) A person who has filed a notice of intent to claim paternity may at
any time revoke a notice of intent to claim paternity previously filed
therewith and, upon receipt of such notification by the registry, the re-
voked notice of intent to claim paternity shall be deemed a nullity nunc
pro tunc.
(4) An unrevoked notice of intent to claim paternity of a child may be
introduced in evidence by any party, other than the person who filed
such notice, in any proceeding in which such fact may be relevant.
(5) The department shall, upon request, provide the names and ad-
dresses of persons listed with the registry to any court or authorized
agency, and such information shall not be divulged to any other person,
except upon order of a court for good cause shown.
123. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248,251-52 n.5 (1983); N.Y. DoM. REL. § 111(a)(2)-(3)
(McKinney 1977 and Supp. 1982-1983). The statute provided in pertinent part:
(2) Persons entitled to notice, pursuant to subdivision one of this sec-
tion, shall include: (a) any person adjudicated by a court in this State to
be the father of the child; (b) any person adjudicated by a court of an-
other state or territory of the United States to be the father of the child,
when a certified copy of the court order has been filed with the putative
father registry, pursuant to section three hundred seventy-two-c of the
social services law; (c) any person who has timely filed an unrevoked
notice of intent to claim paternity of the child, pursuant to section three
hundred seventy-two of the social services law; (d) any person who is
recorded on the child's birth certificate as the child's father; (e) any per-
son who is openly living with the child and the child's mother at the time
the proceeding is initiated and who is holding himself out to be the
child's father; (f) any person who has been identified as the child's father
by the mother in written, sworn statement; and (g) any person who was
married to the child's mother within six months subsequent to the birth
of the child and prior to the execution of a surrender instrument or the
initiation of a proceeding pursuant to section three hundred eighty-four-
b of the social services law.
(3) The sole purpose of notice under this section shall be to enable the
person served pursuant to subdivision two to present evidence to the
court relevant to the best interests of the child.
124. Id. at 251-52.
125. Id. at 253.
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Lehr then petitioned the New York courts for vacation of the order
granting the Robertson adoption, on the grounds that his constitu-
tional rights of due process and equal protection had been violated. 126
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Lehr claimed that he had "an abso-
lute right to notice and an opportunity to be heard."127 The majority
held that there had been no denial of due process because the right to
receive notice of a pending adoption action was completely within
Lehr's control.128 Quoting from Justice Stewart's Caban dissent, Jus-
tice Stevens stated: "Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the
biological connection between parent and child."129 It is not until the
unwed father comes forward to participate in the rearing of his child
and demonstrates commitment to the child, that the father's interest
in a relationship with the child reaches a stature worthy of substan-
tial constitutional protection.13o Summarizing the majority's position,
Stevens wrote:
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father
an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his
offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of respon-
sibility for the child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child
relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child's develop-
ment. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not automatically com-
pel a state to listen to his opinion of where the child's best interests lie.13 1
Given the finding under the due process inquiry that Lehr had not
established a relationship with his child worthy of protection, the
Court also rejected his equal protection claim.132 Under an equal pro-
tection inquiry, if it can be shown that classes treated differently
under the law are not in fact similarly situated, the law may constitu-
126. Id. at 253-54.
127. Id. at 250.
128. Id. at 264. Registration with the putative father registry would have guaranteed
Lehr notice of an adoption proceeding. See supra notes 122-23.
129. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 (1983). Driving home the point that biologi-
cal relationships are of secondary importance to emotional ones, Justice Stevens
further asserted for the majority:
[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved
and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive
from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in
'promot[ing] a way of life' through the instruction of children... as well
as from the fact of blood relationship.
Id. at 261 (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and
Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977)).
130. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983).
131. Id. at 262. The dissenters, however, contend that the mother's actions interfered
with Lehr's ability to grasp the opportunity offered by the majority. Id. at 271
(White, J., dissenting). The dissent further argued that "[a] 'mere biological rela-
tionship' is not as unimportant in determining the nature of liberty interests as
the majority suggests." Id.
132. Id. at 265-68.
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tionally stand.133 Finding that Lehr and Robertson were not similarly
situated because of their differing levels of involvement with the child,
the majority upheld the challenged statute.134
5. Michael H. v. Gerald D.: The Division Grows
The Supreme Court most recently considered the issue of unwed
fathers' rights in Michael H. v. Gerald D. 135 Facing the Court was the
issue of the constitutionality of a California statute which presumed
that the child of a woman living with her husband is a child of the
marriage.' 36 This presumption could be rebutted only by showing
that the husband was impotent or sterile or by blood tests.13 7
After two years of marriage to Gerald D., Carol D. began an adul-
terous affair with her neighbor, Michael H.138 Three years later,
Carol gave birth to a baby girl, and, although Gerald was listed on the
birth certificate as the father, Carol told Michael that he was the fa-
ther.339 Subsequent blood tests established with 98.07% probability
that Michael was, indeed, the father.140
In the three years following the child's birth, Carol and her daugh-
ter lived intermittently with Gerald, Michael, and another man. Upon
reconciling with Gerald just one year after the birth, however, Carol
refused Michael any future visitation with his daughter.'4' In re-
sponse, Michael filed a paternity action and sought to secure visitation
rights.142 Gerald successfully intervened, and his motion for sum-
mary judgment was granted on the ground that the marital presump-
tion left no issue of fact in dispute.143
133. Id. at 267.
134. Id. The differing situation found by the Court was that Robertson had estab-
lished a custodial relationship with the child while Lehr had established no rela-
tionship with the child. Id. at 267-68.
For further discussion of Lehr, see Elizabeth Buchanon, The Constitutional
Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 Omo ST. L.J. 313
(1984); Nanette Dembitz, Lehr Decision Helps Out-Of-Wedlock Newborns Find
Homes, 70 A.B. J. 126 (Jan. 1984); Jennifer J. Raab, Comment, Lehr v. Robert-
son: Unwed Fathers and Adoption-How Much Process is Due?, 7 HARv. WoMEN's
L.J. 265 (1984).
135. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
136. Id. at 115. The challenged statute was CAL. Evm. CODE § 621(a) (West Supp.
1989)(amended 1990).
137. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 115 (1989). A motion compelling blood
tests, however, could only be made by the husband or, if the alleged biological
father had filed a petition to establish paternity, by the wife/mother. See CAL.
EviD. CODE § 621(c)-(d) (West Supp. 1989)(amended 1990).
138. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989).
139. Id. at 113-14.
140. Id. at 114.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 115.
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The continued division of the Court on this issue showed in that no
majority opinion was offered.144 Justice Scalia, writing the plurality
opinion, stated that a reading of the Stanley, Caban, and Lehr prece-
dents "as establishing that a liberty interest is created by biological
fatherhood plus an established paternal relationship... distorts the
rationale of those cases."145 On the other hand, four dissenters held a
contrary position. They asserted that Michael's rights did deserve
constitutional protection because he had met the "biological plus" test
set forth in those previous decisions.46 And in a separate concurring
opinion, Justice Stevens, who had written the majority opinion in
Lehr47 and a strong dissent in Caban,148 admitted that the Stan-
ley' 49 and Caban50 decisions do "demonstrate that enduring 'family'
relationships may develop in unconventional settings."151 For that
reason, he "would not foreclose the possibility that a constitutionally
protected relationship between a natural father and his child might
exist in a case like this."52
Nevertheless, the plurality asserted that the parentage presump-
tion was constitutional, both facially and as applied in the case at bar,
because it was a reasonable and justifiable means for the state to
"promot[e] the 'peace and tranquility of states and families.'"153 Ac-
cording to Scalia, to merit constitutional protection, an unwed father's
right to maintain a relationship with his child must be a right that
has been "traditionally protected by our society."154 Gerald's relation-
ship, therefore, merited protection, while Michael's did not, because
our society has traditionally protected the marital relationship and
the family unit, and has not traditionally recognized the "power of the
natural father to assert parental rights over a child born into a wo-
man's existing marriage with another man."155 Criticizing this rea-
soning, Justice Brennan stated that if the Court had asked itself
whether the specific interest under consideration had been tradition-
144. Id at 110.
145. Id. at 123.
146. Id. at 142-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting), 159-60 (White, J., dissenting).
147. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). See supra notes 112-34 and accompany-
ing text.
148. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). See supra notes 86-111 and accompa-
nying text.
149. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). See supra notes 47-65 and accompanying
text.
150. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
151. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 133 (1989)(Stevens, J., concurring).
152. Id. In fact, Justice Stevens stated he was "willing to assume... that Michael's
relationship with Victoria [was] strong enough to give him a constitutional right"
to be heard. Id. This statement shows Justice Stevens' recognition of the "biol-
ogy-plus" test.
153. Id. at 125.
154. Id. at 122.
155. Id. at 125.
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ally protected when it heard Eisenstadt,156 Griswold,157 Ingraham,158
Vitek,159 or Stanley,160 the answer, necessarily, would have been
"no."161 Yet, that was not how the Court addressed those cases.162
In sum, Michael H. left more questions unresolved regarding the
position of the Supreme Court on the issue of unwed fathers' rights
than it answered.163
6. -Is a Synthesis or Prediction Possible?
Prior to the announcement of Michael H.,164 the test to be applied
in actions challenging an alleged statutory deprivation of unwed fa-
thers' rights seemed, if not clear, at least discernible. The Lehr
Court's full development of the "biology-plus" test held that a biologi-
cal link "offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male
possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring."165 Although
the Court did not offer constitutional protection to the biological rela-
tionship itself, the Court held that if the father grasps the opportunity
afforded him by that biological link and develops a relationship with
the child his rights will receive constitutional protection.166
As noted previously, Justice Scalia's plurality decision in Michael
H. seemed to reject the biology-plus test,167 while the dissenting opin-
ions of Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and White argued
forcefully for the validity of the test.168 Given that since the 1989 de-
cision in Michael H., the four dissenters have left the Court, replaced
156. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972Xrecognizing right of unmarried couples
to use contraceptives).
157. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)(recognizing right of married couples
to use contraceptives).
158. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977Xrecognizing right of freedom from corpo-
ral punishment in schools).
159. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980)(recognizing right of freedom from arbitrary
transfer from jail to psychiatric institution).
160. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)(recognizing right to raise one's natural
but illegitimate children).
161. Michael I. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 139 (1989)(Brennan, J., dissenting).
162. Id.
163. For further discussion of Michael H., see Catherine A. Filhiol, Note, Family Law
Symposium: Michael H. v. Gerald D.: Upholding the Marital Presumption
Against a Dual Paternity Claim, 50 LA. L. REV. 1015 (1991); Robin West, The
Ideal of Liberty: A Comment on Michael H. v. Gerald D., 139 U. P_& L. REv. 1373
(1991).
164. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
165. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983). See supra notes 112-34 and accom-
panying text.
166. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983). See supra notes 112-34 and accom-
panying text.
167. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989). See supra notes 135-63 and
accompanying text.
168. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 142-43 (1989), (Brennan, J., dissenting),
159-60 (White, J., dissenting). See supra notes 135-63 and accompanying text.
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by Justices Thomas, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, the biology-plus
test could, indeed, be dead at the Supreme Court level.
Adding to the confusion, the Supreme Court has not yet addressed
a case where an infant was placed for adoption, terminating the pa-
rental rights of an unwed father without his consent. Under the biol-
ogy-plus test, such a father would be unable to assert any
constitutional rights because he-would lack the necessary substantial
relationship with the child. If the biology-plus test was rendered im-
potent by Michael H., would the Court, instead, choose to protect only
those rights "traditionally protected by our society?"169 Would it con-
sider the biological link itself, or only such a link coupled with an at-
tempt to establish a relationship worthy of constitutional protection?
It is quite impossible to predict. Nonetheless, as the following highly
publicized state court decisions have shown, the trend is to confer
more and more deference to that biological link.
C. Unwed Fathers' Rights at the State Level
1. Recent State Court Interpretation and Application of United
States Supreme Court Rulings Regarding Unwed
Fathers' Rights
a. Baby Jessica
In one of the most highly-publicized child custody battles ever, the
courts of Iowa and Michigan addressed the implications created by the
placement of an infant for adoption in In re B. G. C. 170 Baby girl Clau-
sen, or Baby Jessica, was born February 8, 1991 to an unwed Cara
Clausen.171 Cara named her current boyfriend, Scott, as the father of
the baby, and both signed a release of parental rights, as well as waiv-
ers of notice of the termination hearing.172 On February 25, 1991, a
hearing was held terminating the parental rights of Scott and Cara,
and granting custody of Jessica to Jan and Roberta DeBoer. 173
When Cara later moved to revoke her release of custody, she also
stated that she had lied earlier, and that Daniel Schmidt was the nat-
ural father of Jessica.174 Daniel then intervened in the adoption pro-
ceeding, established his paternity, and sought to assert his parental
rights.175 In support of their petition for adoption, the DeBoers
claimed that Schmidt was an unfit parent because he had abandoned
Jessica and had also abandoned two other illegitimate children born
169. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989).
170. 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992).
171. Id. at 240.
172. Id. at 240-41.
173. Id. at 241; In re Baby Girl Clausen, 501 N.W.2d 193, 194 (Mch. Ct. App. 1993).
174. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1992).
175. Id.
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several years earlier.176 The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the dis-
trict court, ruling that the DeBoers had failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that Schmidt had abandoned Jessica or that
Schmidt was an unfit parent, and that a "best interests" inquiry was
irrelevant until abandonment had been established.37 7
In introducing its opinion, the court admitted it would be tempting
to decide such a case based on emotion, but asserted that to do so
would be an impermissible attempt at "uncontrolled social engineer-
ing."s78 The court then rejected the argument that Schmidt had aban-
doned his child simply because he failed to protect his rights at the
time Cara Clausen's pregnancy became known.179 More importantly,
the court noted that a finding of abandonment, and therefore, a result-
ing termination of parental rights, "would deprive a father of a mean-
ingfil right, protected by the Constitution, to develop a parent-child
relationship.".10 This court, it appears, has taken the constitutional
protection afforded by the Supreme Court to an existing biological and
emotional relationship, and extended that protection to the opportu-
nity to develop an emotional relationship, which the biological link
provides.181
In an unprecedented action, the DeBoers challenged the Iowa rul-
ing in their home state of Michigan, asking the Michigan courts to
apply a best interest of the child standard.182 Although a Michigan
county court ruled in favor of the DeBoers, the Michigan Court of Ap-
peals ruled that the Michigan courts had no jurisdiction to intervene,
and held that the Iowa order compelling the return of Jessica to
Daniel Schmidt must be enforced.183 The Michigan Supreme Court
echoed the sensitivity of the Iowa court, but confirmed that Jessica
176. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 501 N.W.2d 193, 194 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
177. Id.; In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1992).
178. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1992)(quotingln re Burney, 259 N.W.2d
322, 324 (Iowa 1977)).
179. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239,241 n.1 (Iowa 1992). The court noted that such an
expectation of the father would be "totally unrealistic; [as] it would require a po-
tential father to become involved in the pregnancy on the mere speculation that
he might be the father." Id. Given that Iowa law requires a clear and convincing
showing of abandonment by the father before his parental rights may be termi-
nated, the court stated: "To hold that Daniel's action was required immediately
... at the risk of losing his parental rights would fly in the face of that standard."
Id. See IowA Cona A N. § 600.8 (1992).
180. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 241 n.1 (Iowa 1992).
181. Id. at 246. The court did not do so lightly either. It recognized "the heartache
which this decision will ultimately cause," but asserted that it was "presented
with no other option than that dictated by the law in this state." Id. (quoting the
district court's opinion).
182. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 501 N.W.2d 193, 195 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
183. Id. at 198.
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must be returned to Daniel pursuant to the Iowa ruling.184 In the
DeBoers' appeal to Justice Stevens, Circuit Justice for the Sixth Cir-
cuit, asking for a stay of the Iowa and Michigan rulings, they again
argued that Jessica's best interests would be served if she remained
with the DeBoers.185 Justice Stevens found that "[neither Iowa law,
Michigan law, nor federal law authorizes unrelated persons to retain
custody of a child whose natural parents have not been found to be
unfit simply because they may be better able to provide for her future
and her education."186
b. Baby Richard
In In re Doe, an equally well-publicized and disputed case, the Illi-
nois Supreme Court unanimously overturned the trial court and ap-
pellate court decisions, which had found the natural father was unfit,
and therefore, had no standing to withhold his consent to the adoption
of his child.1S7 Baby Richard was born to unwed parents Daniella
Janikova and Otakar Kirchner on March 16, 1991.188 Four days later
Daniella executed a consent to adoption, stated that the biological fa-
ther was unknown, and Baby Richard was placed with his adoptive
family.'8 9 Fifty-seven days after Richard's birth, Daniella reconciled
with Otakar and finally told him of Richard's existence and adop-
tion.190 She had previously maintained that Richard died at birth.191
In response to the news that he had a son, Otakar filed an appear-
ance in the adoption proceeding, which was subsequently struck by
the trial court because he lacked standing.192 After Otakar and
184. In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 668 (Mich. 1993). Although recognizing the emo-
tional stake that the parties had in the outcome, the court recognized a higher
purpose. It stated:
[Tlhese cases have been litigated through fervent emotional appeals,
with counsel and the adult parties pleading that their only interests are
to do what is best for the child, who is herself blameless for this pro-
tracted litigation and the grief it has caused .... It is now time for the
adults to move beyond saying that their only concern is the welfare of
the child and to put those words into action by assuring that the transfer
of custody is accomplished promptly.
Id. (footnote omitted).
185. DeBoer v. DeBoer, 114 S. Ct. 1 (1993).
186. Id. at 2. For further discussion of the baby Jessica saga, see Nancy Gibbs, In
Whose Best Interest?, Tm, July 19, 1993, at 45; Sam H. Verhorek, Michigan
Court Says Adopted Girl Must Be Sent to Biological Parents, N.Y. Tzms, July 3,
1993, at A6; Edward Walsh, Two Parents Too Many for a Little Girl, WASH. PoST,
June 4, 1993, at C1.
187. In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1994).
188. In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 650 (I1. App. Ct. 1993).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 651.
[Vol. 74:180
UNWED FATHERS' RIGHTS
Daniella's September, 1991 wedding, Otakar ified a petition to estab-
lish paternity, which successfully established his paternity.' 93 Re-
sponding to Otakar's newfound standing, the Doesl94 amended their
adoption petition, asserting that Otakar was an unfit parent by virtue
of the "failure to demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest, concern
or responsibility" as to Richard during the first 30 days after his
birth.'95
Both the trial and appellate courts agreed with the Does, finding
that Otakar was unfit, and that the interests of the child must come
before the interests of biological parents. 96 Specifically, the courts
noted that Otakar did not confront Daniella about her claim of Rich-
ard's death, he did not consult a lawyer about his rights and responsi-
bilities as an unwed father, and he did not file suit to establish
paternity prior to Richard's birth.197 A strong dissent at the appellate
court level admitted the best interests of the child are important, but
noted that "we cannot ignore the gross injustice perpetrated upon the
biological father in this instance."' 98
Building off the appellate court dissent, the Illinois Supreme Court
reversed in a very short, unanimous, opinion.' 99 Justice Heiple, writ-
ing for the court, stated that the lower court findings were not sup-
ported by the evidence, that Otakar had been denied the opportunity
to discharge his familial duty, and that there was not compliance with
the Illinois law requirement of a good-faith effort to notify natural par-
ents of adoption proceedings. 200 The court also noted that efforts by
the mother, adoptive family, and other interested parties to prevent
the unwed father from establishing contact or discovering the wherea-
193. Id.
194. The identity of the adoptive parents was protected by the use of the fictional
name "Doe."
195. In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 651 (M11. App. Ct. 1993).
196. Id. at 652, 655-56.
197. Id. at 654. Illinois law allows an unwed father to assert his parental rights before
the child's birth by filing a petition to establish paternity. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
47, 5 (1992).
198. In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 663 (IM. App. Ct. 1993)(Tully, P.J., dissenting). Pre-
siding Justice Tully concluded his dissent by reminding the court that:
The tradition of adoption in our society was created in order to provide a
place of love and care for abandoned, unwanted and orphaned children.
Baby Richard was never abandoned or unwanted. American society
should not be so devoid of humanity, fairness and just plain good com-
mon sense.
Id. at 666 (Tully, P.J., dissenting).
199. In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1994).
200. Id. Showing his displeasure with the lower court holdings, Heiple further wrote:
"The adoption laws of Illinois are neither complex nor difficult of application ....
These laws are designed to protect natural parents in their preemptive rights to
their own children wholly apart from any consideration of the so-called best inter-
ests of the child." Id. at 182.
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bouts of his child must be taken into consideration.201 In writing in
support of the denial of rehearing, Justice Heiple stated that where
the adoptive parents and their attorney knew that a real father ex-
isted and that the name of the father was known to the mother but she
simply refused to disclose it, the adoptive parents proceed at their own
peril.2 0 2
This holding is significant in that it also extends the unwed fa-
ther's rights beyond the requirements set forth in the "biology-plus"
test. Here, sufficient attempts to establish contact or provide support
will qualify the father's interests for constitutional protection.20 3
201. Id. at 182 (McMorrow, J., concurring). The concurrence stated that the court
must be "mindful of the circumstances in each case[.] [A] court is to examine the
parent's efforts to communicate with and show interest in the child, not the suc-
cess of those efforts." Id. (quoting In re Syck, 562 N.E.2d 174 (111. 1990)).
202. Id. at 181. Justice Heiple concluded that writing, in which he responded to the
criticism heaped upon the court by the Chicago media, by stating. "We must re-
member that the purpose of an adoption is to provide a home for a child, not a
child for a home." Id.
203. See id. For additional developments of unwed fathers' rights via case law, see In
re Kayla L.C., 503 N.W.2d 22 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993)(holding that putative father
accused of sexual assault has right to demonstrate a protected liberty interest
and if successful, contest the sexual assault allegation); In re M.N.M., 605 A.2d
921 (D.C. 1992)(holding that once paternity is established, unwed father must
have opportunity to present evidence of child's best interests, despite passing of
statute of limitations); In re Kelsy S., 823 P.2d 1216 (Cal. 1992)(interpretingLehr
to mean that unwed father need only make reasonable and meaningful attempt
to establish a relationship and holding that when the father steps forward to
grasp his opportunity, his rights deserve constitutional protection); In re Raquel
Marie X, 559 N.E.2d 418 (N.Y. 1990)(holding a father who has taken every avail-
able avenue to demonstrate that he is willing and able to enter into the fullest
possible relationship with his child is entitled to full constitutional protection in
preventing the termination of the relationship by strangers, even if he has not yet
established any relationship with his child.); In re B.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545 (La.
1990)(holding that the interest of a biological parent in having an opportunity to
establish a relationship with his child is worthy of constitutional protection, and
further holding that Louisiana's putative father registry is insufficient to protect
the father's interests in that it does not provide for notice or pre-termination pro-
cedure before a neutral decision maker); In re K.B.E. and T.M.E, 740 P.2d 292
(Utah 1987)(holding that father's failure by a few hours to timely file his notice of
intent to claim paternity could not bar father from asserting his parental rights,
because to do so would fly in the face of fundamental due process and because the
registry statute was not created to encourage a "race" to cut off the father's
rights); In re Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986)(holding that where a fa-
ther does not know of the need to protect his rights, he has no reasonable oppor-
tunity to assert or protect those rights, and therefore, coming forward within a
reasonable time thereafter should be deemed to comply with the statutory regis-
try deadline).
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D. Nebraska: Development of a Statutory Adoption Scheme
and its Application in Case Law
1. L.B. 224: Nebraska Responds to Stanley
Scared into action by the implications of the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Stanley, in September of 1974, a commit-
tee of attorneys and adoption agency representatives began work on a
legislative bill that would revise the Nebraska adoption statutes. At
the time of the Stanley decision, the Nebraska adoption statutes pro-
vided no rights for an unwed father.20 4 Only the consent of the
mother was required to place a child born out of wedlock for adoption,
and no notice to the father of an adoption proceeding was
necessary.20 5
The call to arms of the committee members came, not when Stan-
ley was handed down, but in 1974 when a county court judge, con-
cerned about the statute's failure to provide notice to the father prior
to termination of his parental rights, ordered publication of an adop-
tion proceeding notice.206 In cases where the unwed father's identity
was unknown, the judge required publication of a notice similar to the
following.
Notice, Sarpy County, the County Court of Sarpy County, Nebraska, (book
page and number given), the matter of the adoption of baby girl (surname of
mother), a minor, to the unknown father and to all concerned. Notice is
hereby given that a petition has been filed in the adoption of baby girl (sur-
name), a minor, alleging that this child has been abandoned by her natural
father, as defined by the Nebraska statute, and that a petition will be heard in
this Court, on (some date), at 9:00 in the morning.2 07
While such a notice would, admittedly, pose little cause for concern
in a metropolitan area, the "horror" 2 08 of publishing such a notice in a
rural community, the "injury to [the] clients as adopting parents, 2 09
and the injury "to the child who is being adopted 21 0 caused by such
notice served as quite a motivating factor in the development of the
204. NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-104 (Reissue 1974). The statute provided:
No adoption shall be decreed unless the petition therefor[e] is accompa-
nied by written consents thereto executed by (1) the minor child, if over
fourteen years of age, (2) any district court or separate juvenile court in
the State of Nebraska having jurisdiction of the custody of a minor child
by virtue of divorce proceedings had in any district court or separate ju-
venile court in the State of Nebraska, and (3) both parents, if living; the
surviving parent of a child born in lawful wedlock; or the mother of a
child born out of wedlock ....
205. Id.
206. Paternity Procedures Bill: Hearing on L.B. 224 Before the Judic. Comm., 84th
Leg., 1st Sess. 6-8 (Jan. 29, 1975).
207. Id. at 7.
208. Id. at 8.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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bill.211 The committee developed one bill which was proposed to the
Legislature during the 1974 session but died there.2' 2 The product of
further effort was Legislative Bill 224 (L.B. 224),213 which was "in-
tended to provide a definitive procedure whereby the rights of pater-
nity, if any, of a natural father of a child born out of wedlock being
placed for adoption be resolved and/or extinguished."214 The scheme
developed by the committee to satisfy that intent was to terminate
completely the unwed father's parental rights if he failed to file a no-
tice of intent to claim paternity within five days after the child's
birth.215
The fundamental flaw with L.B. 224 was that it was developed by
people concerned about the ramifications of Stanley.21 6 These people,
naturally, were adoption agencies, their lawyers, and lawyers repre-
senting adoptive parents.2 1 7 Unwed fathers were not represented
during development of the bill. Despite testimony that members of
the committee "have done their best to protect the interest of the fa-
ther,"218 the concerns addressed by the committee focused on the
problems created by Stanley's recognition of an unwed father's rights.
Among the problems discussed by committee members at the commit-
tee hearing were: (1) court requirements of notice to the father in lieu
of relinquishment,219 (2) providing assurances to adoptive couples
that their adoption will not be blocked or delayed by a putative fa-
ther,220 and (3) avoiding the public embarrassment or condemnation
resulting from publications of notice.22 '
In order to solve these problems, which are all created by the exist-
ence of an unwed father with protected rights, the committee proposed
a scheme in which failure to file the necessary notice of parental in-
tent within five days of the child's birth resulted in a statutory relin-
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1.
213. Id.
214. Introducer's Statement of Purpose: L.B. 224 by Sen. Gary Anderson 1 (Jan. 25,
1975).
215. Paternity Procedures Bill: Hearing on L.B. 224 Before the Judic. Comm., 84th
Leg., 1st Sess. 2 (Jan. 29, 1975). The choice of the five day window of opportunity
was arrived at somewhat by happenstance. In the words of the bill's introducer:
"I think five days was picked out, primarily because this is pretty much a stan-
dard length of time that a child and the mother might be kept in the hospital
anyway." Id. This was a rather arbitrary choice and meaningless now that a
standard hospital stay is not more than two days.
216. Paternity Procedures Bill: Judic. Comm. Statement on L.B. 224, 84th Leg., 1st
Sess. 1 (Feb. 3, 1975).
217. Id.
218. Paternity Procedures Bill: Hearing on L.B. 224 Before the Judic. Comm., 84th
Leg., 1st Sess. 8 (Jan. 29, 1975).
219. Id. at 1.
220. Id. at 2.
221. Id. at 8-9.
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quishment of all parental rights. 22 2 This relinquishment allowed the
mother's consent to be sufficient to place a child born out of wedlock
for adoption.2 23 If the necessary notice was timely filed, the statutory
scheme provided procedures for a judicial determination of pater-
nity 2 2 4 and for a determination of custody.22 5
222. Introducer's Statement of Purpose: L.B. 224 by Sen. Gary Anderson 1 (Jan. 25,
1975). See L.B. 224, § 3, 1975 Neb. Laws 444, 445 (codified as amended at NEB.
REV. STAT. § 43-104.02 (Reissue 1993)). The codified section now reads:
(1) Relinquishment or consent for the purpose of adoption given only by
a mother of a child born out of wedlock pursuant to section 43-104 shall
be sufficient to place the child for adoption and the rights of any alleged
father shall not be recognized thereafter in any court unless the person
claiming to be the father of the child has filed with the Department of
Social Services on forms provided by the department, within five days
after the birth of such child, a notice of intent to claim paternity.
(2) The notice shall contain the claimant's name and address, the name
and last-known address of the mother, and the month and year of the
birth or the expected birth of the child.
223. L.B. 224, § 3, 1975 Neb. Laws 444,445 (codified as amended at NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 43-104.02 (Reissue 1993)). See also id. § 5, 1975 Neb. Laws 444, 445-46 (codi-
fied as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104.04 (Reissue 1993)). The codified
section now reads:
Ifa notice of paternity is not filed within five days, the mother of a child
born out ofwedlock or an agent specifically designated in writing by the
mother may request, and the Department of Social Services shall supply,
a certificate that no notice of intent to claim paternity has been filed with
the department and the filing of such certificate pursuant to section 43-
102 shall eliminate the need or necessity of a consent or relinquishment
for adoption by the natural father of such child.
224. L.B. 224, § 6, 1975 Neb. Laws 444, 446 (codified as amended at NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 43-104.05 (Reissue 1993)). The codified section now reads:
If a notice of intent to claim paternity is filed within five days after the
birth of such child, either the claimant-father, the mother, or her agent
specifically designated in writing may file a petition in the county court
in the county where such child is a resident for an adjudication of the
claim of paternity. After the filing of such petition, the court shall set a
hearing date upon proper notice to the parties not less than ten nor more
than twenty days after such filing. If the mother contests the claim of
paternity, the court shall take such testimony as shall enable it to deter-
mine the facts.
225. Id. § 7, 1975 Neb. Laws 444, 446 (codified as amended at NEB. Rxv. STAT. § 43-
104.06 (Reissue 1993)). The codified section now reads:
(1) If the claimant seeks to oppose any proposed relinquishment of a
child by the mother and requests custody of the child, the court shall
inquire into the fitness of the claimant, his or her ability to properly care
for the child, and whether the best interests of the child will be served by
granting custody to the claimant. Only upon the appointment of a
guardian ad litem for the child, and a finding that the claimant is a fit
person, is able to properly care for the child, and that the child's best
interests will be served by granting custody to the claimant, shall cus-
tody be granted to the claimant.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in the Nebraska Indian Child Welfare
Act, upon relinquishment by the mother to a child placement agency li-
censed by the State of Nebraska, or upon a finding that the child's best
interests would not be served by granting custody to the claimant, to-
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Filing of the required notice had a more substantial effect on the
unwed father than mere reservation of his potential parental rights.
Legislative Bill 224 provided that the notice form must also contain an
acknowledgment by the father of his financial liability for the support
and education of his child and for any pregnancy-related medical ex-
penses of the mother.226 Further, the bill provided that the acknowl-
edgment may be introduced as evidence in any paternity adjudication
and may be used to estop the unwed father from denying his paternity
or liability for support.227 In spite of the one-sidedness of the pro-
posed legislative scheme, L.B. 224 was quickly passed by the legisla-
ture228 and signed into law by the Governor.229
2. Judicial Application of the New Statutory Scheme
a. Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Services Bureau, Inc.230
Jerry Shoecraft learned that his girlfriend, Sheri Davis, was preg-
nant in June 1984.231 During the pregnancy the two remained in con-
tact and had extended discussions concerning the prospective birth of
the child.232 Shoecraft knew as much as four months in advance of
the expected birth of plans for Davis to move to an outstate home and
of the possibility that the child would be placed for adoption.233
Shoecraft did not offer financial support to meet the costs of Davis'
outstate residence nor any of the pregnancy-related medical costs. 2 34
gether with the recommendation by the guardian ad litem, and a finding
that termination of the rights of the mother and the father is in the best
interests of the child, the court shall terminate the rights of the mother
and father and confer such rights upon the licensed child placement
agency to whom the relinquishment has been given.
226. Id. § 4, 1975 Neb. Laws 444, 445 (codified as amended at NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-
104.03 (Reissue 1993)). The codified section now reads:
Within three days after the filing of a notice to claim paternity, the Di-
rector of Social Services shall cause a certified copy of such notice to be
mailed by certified mail to (1) the mother or prospective mother of such
child at the last-known address shown on the notice of intent to claim
paternity, or (2) an agent specifically designated in writing by the
mother or prospective mother to receive such notice. The notice shall...
estop the claimant from denying his paternity of such child thereafter
and shall contain language that he acknowledges liability for contribu-
tion to the support and education of the child after its birth and for con-
tribution to the pregnancy-related medical expenses of the mother.
227. See id.
228. 1 Neb. Leg. J., 84th Leg., 1st Sess. 698-99 (1975).
229. Id. at 807. For further discussion of this legislative process see Betty J. Stahl,
Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Services Bureau: For An Unwed Father, Five Days Is
Forever, 20 CREmrON L. Rv. 647, 671-75 (1987).
230. 222 Neb. 574, 385 N.W.2d 448 (1986).
231. Id. at 576, 385 N.W.2d at 450.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
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Shoecraft was notified on the date of the child's birth and visited Davis
shortly thereafter.235 Davis subsequently relinquished the child, Jus-
tin, for adoption. In an attempt to assert his rights, Shoecraft filed a
notice of intent to claim paternity.236 Shoecraft filed the notice nine
days after Justin's birth, rather than within the statutorily allowed
five days.2 37
Shoecraft then filed a petition acknowledging his paternity, de-
manding custody of Justin, seeking a writ a habeas corpus to secure
custody,238 and challenging the constitutionality of Nebraska's adop-
tion statutes.23 9 The district court found that Shoecraft did have a
constitutionally protected right to form and maintain a relationship
with his son.240 The court further found that the five-day statute of
limitations was "absurdly short" and did not adequately protect
Shoecraf's "opportunity to form" a relationship with his son.2 4 1
In outlining its approach to the case, the Nebraska Supreme Court
observed that "disparate treatment of an unwed father and of an un-
wed mother in child adoption proceedings is a suspect classifica-
tion."2 42 The Court then stated that a statute involving suspect
classification must pass a strict scrutiny analysis.243 It continued:
"Under this test, strict congruence must exist between the classifica-
tion and the statute's purpose. The end the legislature seeks to effec-
tuate must be a compelling state interest, and the means employed in
the statute must be such that no less restrictive alternative exists."244
In its analysis, the court first noted that the statute's failure to
provide notice to the father of the birth of the child might render it
violative of the Due Process Clause.245 It found, however, that be-
cause Shoecraft knew of the pregnancy, knew the mother's wherea-
bouts, and was advised of the birth on the date of its occurrence, the
lack of notice, as applied to Shoecraft, was not an unconstitutional
deprivation of his due process rights.246
Noting that the five-day notice statute's disparate treatment be-
tween an unwed father and an unwed mother is "[ifairly obvious[ ]",
235. Id.
236. Id. at 575, 385 N.W.2d at 450.
237. Id.
238. See supra note 15.
239. Petition at 1-3, Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, Inc. (Lancaster
County Dist. Ct. June 14, 1985)(No. 391-287).
240. Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, Inc., No. 391-287, slip op. at 13
(Lancaster County Dist. Ct. June 14, 1985).
241. Id. I 11, 13.
242. Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, Inc., 222 Neb. 574, 577, 385 N.W.2d
448, 451 (1986).
243. Id.
244. Id. (quoting State v. Michalski, 221 Neb. 380, 385, 377 N.W.2d 510, 515 (1985)).
245. Id. at 578, 385 N.W.2d at 451.
246. Id.
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the court then began its analysis of Shoecraft's equal protection
claim.2 47 The court flatly stated that "the state has a compelling in-
terest in the well-being of all children, whether born in or out of wed-
lock... ." 24 8 It then gave its endorsement to the judgment of the
Legislature that "the placement of the child in a home with persons
anxious to have, love, and rear the child is to be preferred over a bat-
tleground;"249 "[t]hat prospective adoptive parents would assume cus-
tody of a newborn with the prospect of later having to surrender the
child is questionable;" 250 and that it is "clear that the problems of un-
wed births and adoptions are legitimate concerns of the Legisla-
ture."251 The court, however, failed to provide support for these
assertions and failed to address whether any less restrictive alterna-
tive to the one challenged existed, as part of its previously defined
strict scrutiny analysis.252 Finally, in discounting Shoecraft's inter-
est, the court proclaimed that Shoecraft had exhibited no responsibil-
ity for mother or child, had not established a relationship with the
child, and therefore, could rightly be treated differently by the Ne-
braska adoption law.253
In his dissent, Chief Justice Krivosha recognized the issues that
would only later be tackled by Baby Jessica 254, Baby Richard,255 and
other cases.256 He questioned the reasonableness of the statute in
that it does not require financial or emotional support, only the timely
filing of the prescribed form.257 Then, echoing the district court's con-
cern and the Lehr Court's discussion regarding the protection of an
opportunity to develop a relationship, Chief Justice Krivosha queried:
But how can this father, or any father, under [section] 43-104.02 live with the
child, nurture it, and support it if his rights to the child can be terminated
during the time that the mother and child are in the hospital and before he is
afforded any opportunity to establish those necessary ties?2 58
He further recognized that the Caban court had specifically rejected
the arguments that subjecting the rights of the father in favor of the
mother or supporting speedy adoptions are necessary, as the Shoecraft
247. Id.
248. Id. at 577, 385 N.W.2d at 451.
249. Id. at 579, 385 N.W.2d at 452.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 580, 385 N.W.2d at 452.
252. See id.
253. Id. at 580, 385 N.W.2d at 452. In dismissing Shoecrafts claim, the court also
noted that ignorance of the notice requirement is no excuse, as Shoecraft "is pre-
sumed, as are all citizens, to know the law." Id.
254. See supra notes 170-86 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 187-203 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 203.
257. Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, Inc., 222 Neb. 574, 580-85, 385
N.W.2d 448, 453-455 (1986)(Krivosha, C.J., dissenting).
258. Id. at 585, 385 N.W.2d at 455 (Krivosha, C.J., dissenting).
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majority had reasoned.259 Nonetheless, the majority would yield only
so far as to admit that, under a different set of facts, it may find the
challenged statutes unconsitutional.260 Such facts presented them-
selves just one year later.
b. In re S.R.S. and M.B.S.261
For 19 months after the birth of their child, the natural mother
and father, though unmarried, lived together with the child as a fam-
ily.262 The father provided for their support, assisted in household
chores, and assisted in caring for the child.263 Ultimately, although
the two had planned to marry, the relationship dissolved, and the
mother moved in with another man.2 64 Over subsequent months, the
mother left the child with various relatives, and the father took that
opportunity to visit his child.265 He provided money, diapers, and
medication for the child while it was staying with the mother's family,
and he offered other financial assistance, but it was not accepted 2 66
Nearly two years after the child's birth, the mother again took cus-
tody of the child, while living with the other man.2 6 7 She again kept
her whereabouts hidden from the father, who had made it clear he
wanted the child.268 One month later, the mother placed the child for
adoption and did not tell the father.2 69 During the next few months,
the father repeatedly contacted the mother's family in a search for in-
formation about the child270 He learned about the adoption four
months after the child had been placed in an adoptive home.27' The
father then filed an intent to claim paternity, asserting that he had
never consented to the adoption, that he had not intended to relin-
quish his parental rights, and that he wanted custody of his son.27 2
The trial court dismissed his claim, finding that he had abandoned
the child and his parental rights, and that he was barred from assert-
259. Id. at 581-82, 385 N.W.2d at 453, (Krivosha, C.J., dissenting). See Caban v. Mo-
hammed, 441 U.S. 380, 391-92 (1979).
260. Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, Inc., 222 Neb. 574, 578, 385 N.W.2d
448, 451 (1986). For further discussion of Shoecraft, see Stahl, supra note 229.
261. 225 Neb. 759, 408 N.W.2d 272 (1987).
262. Id at 760, 408 N.W.2d at 274.
263. Id. at 760-61, 408 N.W.2d at 274.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 761, 408 N.W.2d at 274. The child's mother, while living with the other
man, had kept their location secret from the father, which had prevented any
contact with the child. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 762, 408 N.W.2d at 275.
268. Id.
269. Id
270. Id. at 762-63, 408 N.W.2d at 275.
271. Id.
272. Id.
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ing his rights by his failure to comply with section 43-104.02273 On
appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed, holding that the natu-
ral father's constitutionally-protected interest in his relationship with
his child had been violated.274 It distinguished the facts from those of
Shoecraft, stating that "[i]n this case the [father] had a familial bond
with the child which afforded his rights substantial protection.275
Resting its decision on Lehr, the court agreed that a biological link
alone may not merit constitutional protection, but when combined
with full commitment by the father, "his interest in personal contact
with his child acquires substantial protection...." 27 6
Chief Justice Krivosha again wrote separately concurring in the
result.2 77 Reiterating his position that Shoecraft was wrongly decided
and that the statutes are facially unconstitutional, he stated:
[Tihis court has now ruled, in effect, that if the child is removed from the
natural mother while in the hospital, thereby making it impossible for the
natural father to establish a relationship with the child, the act will be held
constitutional; but, if the natural mother delays placing the child out for adop-
tion so that the natural father has the opportunity to develop a relationship
with the child, the act will be declared unconstitutional. Such a holding is not,
in my view, based upon any sound legal principals. Such uncertainty is bound
to create much distress, as evidenced by the instant case. The scenario which
I feared our decision in Shoecraft would ultimately bring about has, in my
view, come to pass in the instant case, and will continue to repeat itself in
future cases.
2 7 8
III. ANALYSIS
A. Applying Supreme Court's Standards to the Nebraska
Statutes
There is more to the Nebraska adoption statutes than a five-day
statute of limitations for the unwed father to file a notice of intent to
claim paternity. While that is where it starts, that is not where it
ends. As before mentioned, if the father fails to comply with the notice
provision, his parental rights are terminated.279 If the form is filed,
the statutes then provide that a certified copy of the notice must be
sent to the mother or the agency of her direction, so that the father's
273. Id. at 763, 766, 408 N.W.2d at 275, 277.
274. Id. at 768-69, 408 N.W.2d at 278.
275. Id. at 769, 408 N.W.2d at 278.
276. Id. at 768, 408 N.W.2d at 278 (quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261
(1983)).
277. Id. at 770, 408 N.W.2d at 279. (Krivosha, C.J., concurring).
278. Id. (Krivosha, C.J., concurring). In light of the Scovell v. Scheele conflict and
others like it, Chief Justice Krivosha's statement has proven to be quite
prophetic.
279. See supra notes 222-27 and accompanying text.
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parental interests are made known.28 O After that, either the father,
the mother, or an agent specified by the mother may file a petition to
adjudicate the paternity claim.281 Upon a successful determination of
paternity, the unwed father may oppose relinquishment by the mother
and seek custody of the child.282 To successfully do so, however, the
father must show that he is a fit person and is able to care for the
child.283 He must further show that the child's best interests will be
served by granting custody to the father.284 If the mother has already
relinquished the child, even if the father has asserted his rights by
filing a timely notice, the only way he can defeat the adoption is by
showing that the child's best interests would not be served by the
adoption.285 If he fails to make this showing, his parental rights will
be terminated.286
Standing alone, the five day notice requirement in the statutes
comports with the holdings of the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court stated in Lehr that "the mere existence of a biological link does
not merit equivalent constitutional protection."28 7 The Court required
that a father step forward to participate in the rearing of the child and
demonstrate commitment to the child's future.288 Until he does so,
there is no constitutional protection. Certainly, from a public policy
standpoint, only a father stepping forward and demonstrating interest
in and commitment to his future child would be viewed to merit any
protection, constitutional or otherwise.
Section 43-104.02 may create a short filing deadline only five days
after the child's birth, but it also allows the father to file notice any
time prior to the birth.289 It is not what the statute does, but what it
fails to do, that makes the entire scheme constitutionally defective.
This statute would not unfairly deprive an unwed father of due pro-
cess if, as in Lehr, the father's ability to guarantee that he receive
notice was entirely within his control.290 However, filing the required
notice does not secure the father's rights completely, it merely pre-
280. NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-104.03 (Reissue 1993). See supra notes 222-27 and accom-
panying text.
281. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104.05 (Reissue 1993). See supra notes 222-27 and accom-
panying text.
282. NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-104.06 (Reissue 1993).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983). See supra text accompanying note
113.
288. Id. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
289. NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-104.02 (Reissue 1993). 'he notice shall contain the claim-
ant's name and address... and the month and year of the birth or the expected
birth of the child." Id. (emphasis added).
290. See supra notes 112-134 and accompanying text.
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vents the mother from unilaterally terminating his rights by relin-
quishing the child for adoption. Section 43-104.02 does not guarantee
the father the right to withhold his consent to an adoption, nor does it
guarantee that he receive notice of the birth or a relinquishment by
the mother.
Other states have implemented putative fathers' registries similar
to Nebraska's. 29 1 The key difference is that these registration
schemes mandate that any putative father who has filed a timely no-
tice of parental intent is entitled to notice of any hearing to determine
the identity of the child's father and any hearing to determine or ter-
minate his parental rights. The Nebraska statutory scheme lacks
such mandatory notice. Strict enforcement of the Nebraska statutory
scheme would appear much less harsh if, as in Lehr and these other
states, the ability to guarantee the receipt of notice was entirely
within the unwed father's control.2 92
Instead, Nebraska's scheme forces the father to remain on constant
guard, protecting his parental interests. Even after he has satisfied
the notice requirement, the father must swiftly file a petition seeking
custody of the child to prevent a relinquishment by the mother.293
Obviously, such a petition would be premature before the baby's birth,
and would be dismissed for lack of ripeness of the claim. Therefore,
the father must remain ever vigilant to discover on his own the date of
the child's birth so that he may then assert his rights. These addi-
tional hurdles placed before the father are fundamentally unfair and
would be remedied by mandatory notice to all registered fathers. If he
has met the requirements of section 43-104.02, the state has in its
records the father's identity and location. The state's failure to notify
a father who has asserted his parental rights as required by the stat-
ute violates his constitutionally protected right of due process of
law. 29 4
291. See, e.g., AR. CODE ANN. § 9-9-210 (Michie 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-11-9
(1993); IDAHo CODE § 16-1513 (1994); L& REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:400 (West 1995);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 192-016 (Vernon Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-20
(Michie 1993); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 111-a (McKinney 1995); OKL.m STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 55.1 (West 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-111 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-30-4.8 (1992).
292. The Utah Supreme Court has held that "[ilt is not too harsh to require that those
responsible for bringing children into the world outside the established institu-
tion of marriage should be required either to comply with those statutes that
accord them the opportunity to assert their parental rights or to yield to the
method established by society to raise children in a manner best suited to pro-
mote their welfare." Sachez v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 680 P.2d 753, 756 (Utah
1984).
293. NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-104.06 (Reissue 1993).
294. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). See supra notes 112-134.
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The Nebraska Supreme Court has set forth the analysis it employs
when examining a claimed deprivation of a liberty interest without
due process of law. In State v. Cook295 it held:
The question in the first stage is whether there is a protected liberty interest
at stake. If so, the analysis proceeds to the second stage, in which it is deter-
mined what procedural protections are required. Upon the resolution of that
issue, the analysis moves on to the third and final stage, in which the facts of
the case are examined to ascertain whether there was a denial of that process
which was due.2
9 6
Even in Shoecraft, the court recognized that the relationship between
a parent and his child is constitutionally protected.297 The court ear-
lier had held that "[there is no doubt that among the fundamental
rights retained by the people under Article IX of the Bill of Rights of
the Constitution of the United States is that of integrity of the fam-
ily."298 Clearly, then, the answer to the first stage of the court's analy-
sis must be yes.
At the second stage of the analysis, the Nebraska Supreme Court
has specified the three factors it must consider to determine what pro-
cess is due. The first is "the private interest that will be affected by
the official action."29 9 The second is "the risk of an erroneous depriva-
tion of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards."300
The final factor is "the Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail."301
Regarding the first factor, the United States Supreme Court has
made it clear that a parent's desire for and right to "the companion-
ship, care, custody and management of his or her children" is an im-
portant interest that "undeniably warrants deference and absent a
powerful countervailing interest, protection."S02 The private interest
to be affected here is a substantial one.
Regarding the second factor, the Supreme Court held that "[a] par-
ent's interest in the accuracy... of the decision to terminate his or her
parental status is... a commanding one."3 03 It also noted the serious-
ness of any potentially erroneous determination when it stated:
"When the state initiates a parental rights termination proceeding, it
seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty interest, but to
295. 236 Neb. 636, 463 N.W.2d 573 (1990).
296. Id. at 636,463 N.W.2d at 579 (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990)).
297. Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, Inc., 222 Neb. 574, 577, 385 N.W.2d
448, 451 (1986).
298. State v. Metteer, 203 Neb. 515, 521-22, 279 N.W.2d 374, 378 (1979).
299. In re R.G., 238 Neb. 405, 417, 470 N.W.2d 780, 789 (1991).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
303. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
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end it."304 While the stakes are obviously high, the risks of error are
also necessarily high when any interested party is excluded from the
procedure. An additional procedural safeguard, not only effectively
used in other states but mandated by the United States Supreme
Court,3 0 5 is providing notice to fathers who have registered their no-
tice of parental intent.
Because the State already has all the necessary information to ef-
fect such notice, the third factor to be considered, fiscal or administra-
tive burden, provides no cause to reject the proposed additional
procedural safeguard. No research or tracking of putative fathers is
necessary, as they have presented themselves to the state already.
These fathers are eager to seize their parental rights and responsibili-
ties and only the state's failure to provide notice prevents them from
doing so. Under the "what process is due" determination advanced by
the Nebraska Supreme Court itself, it is clear that more process is due
than has been given. An examination of the facts in addressing the
third stage of the analysis is unnecessary as it has already been deter-
mined that there is a procedural deficiency.306
Addressing the issue of notice, the Supreme Court has said: "The
constitutional right to be heard is a basic aspect of the duty of govern-
ment to follow a fair process of decision-making when it acts to deprive
a person of his possessions."3 07 The Court has further stated that
"For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due pro-
cess has been clear: 'Parties whose rights are to be affected are enti-
tled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must
first be notified.' "308 The Court also noted that "[t]he requirement of
notice and an opportunity to be heard raises no impenetrable barrier
to the taking... [b]ut the fair process of decision making that it guar-
antees works, by itself, to protect against arbitrary deprivation
... "309 The emphasis placed on notice and opportunity to be heard
by the Supreme Court, when compared to the absence of any substan-
304. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982).
305. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
306. In response to the State's argument that in certain emergency circumstances it
may act without recognizing the requirements of due process, the Nebraska
Supreme Court stated: "This may be true for those who live in some societies, but
it is not true for those who live under the flag of the United States of America."
In re R.G., 238 Neb. 405, 419, 470 N.W.2d 780, 790 (1991). Given the court's
position regarding the Nebraska adoption statutes, as represented in Shoecraft,
apparently unwed fathers are not allowed to fly or pledge their allegiance to that
same flag.
307. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972). Admittedly, children are not posses-
sions, but it has been said that the rights to conceive and raise one's children are
"[rights far more precious.., than property rights." May v. Anderson, 345 U.S.
528, 533 (1953).
308. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972)(citations omitted).
309. Id. at 81.
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tial burden created by mandatory notice to registered fathers, makes
it clear that the Nebraska statute is procedurally deficient and must
be amended to include a notice requirement.
The provisions of section 43-104.06 are equally violative of the fa-
ther's rights. No such hurdles regarding a showing of fitness and best
interests of the child face the unwed mother when she seeks custody of
her child. The Supreme Court held that "[glender-based distinctions
'must serve important governmental objectives and must be substan-
tially related to achievement of those objectives.... ' "310 Although
recognizing that a state's interest in providing for the well-being of
children born out of wedlock is an important one, the Court held that
such a reason "is not in itself sufficient to justify the gender-based dis-
tinction" of an adoption statute.3 11 It held that a statutory classifica-
tion of that type "'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circum-
stanced shall be treated alike.'"312 Nevertheless, the Nebraska
Supreme Court held that the state's interest in speedy finalization of
adoptions and placing children in stable homes as soon as possible jus-
tified the gender-based distinction.313
An unwed mother and father, though similarly situated, are not
treated alike by the Nebraska adoption statutes. Where the father
has complied with the notice requirement, he should be viewed in the
law as similarly circumstanced to the mother. While the mother may
carry and bear the child, that is a fact of physical nature, not the emo-
tional nature of her relationship with the child nor the nature of her
rights under the law. The Supreme Court's comment in Caban re-
garding a New York statute may be equally applied here: "The facts of
this case illustrate the harshness of classifying unwed fathers as being
invariably less qualified and entitled than mothers to exercise a con-
cerned judgment as to the fate of their children."314
The Nebraska Supreme Court has failed to provide a cogent argu-
ment that this disparate treatment bears a substantial relation to the
State's interest.3 15 As noted before, in Shoecraft the court makes an
310. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388 (1979)(quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197 (1976)).
311. Id. at 391.
312. Id. (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), and Royster Guano Co. v. Vir-
ginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
313. Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, Inc., 222 Neb. 574, 579, 385 N.W.2d
448, 452 (1986). See also In re S.R.S. and M.B.S., 225 Neb. 759, 408 N.W.2d 272
(1987), where the court discusses and reaffirms its Shoecraft reasoning and
holding.
314. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979).
315. See Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, Inc., 222 Neb. 574, 580-85, 385
N.W.2d 448, 453-55 (1986)(Krivosha, C.J., dissenting).
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unsupported assertion that the State has a compelling interest in: 1)
the well-being of all children, 2) the proper nurture and care of these
children, 3) the transfer of the children from unwed mothers by relin-
quishment, and 4) the adoption of these children.3 16 It then continued
by rationalizing the approach taken by the Legislature, but failed
completely to provide any precedent or legal reasoning that could sup-
port the approach enacted by the Legislature.317 The court also aban-
doned its proposed strict scrutiny analysis when it failed to consider
whether a less restrictive statutory scheme could meet the ends in-
tended by the Legislature.S8 Certainly, such a scheme exists. Fail-
ure of others to act responsibly, though, is no reason to allow these
statutes to ignore or strip in the name of percentages and efficiency,
the rights of those who are courageous enough to step forward. For
those fathers that do comply with Nebraska's registration require-
ment, the state should afford them notice of the child's birth in order
to prevent the potential unconstitutional application of the adoption
statutes.31 9 Further, fathers that comply with Nebraska's statutory
scheme should not face burdens that the unwed mother is not also
required to face. Rather than burden the father with a showing of his
fitness and ability, the adverse party should have the burden of show-
ing the father's unfitness and his inability to be a father.320 Likewise,
rather than burden the father with a showing that the child's best
interests would be served by granting him custody, the adverse party
should have the burden of showing that the best interests of the child
would not be served by placing the child in the father's custody.321
Finally, where the mother has already relinquished the child, the ad-
verse party should again have the burden of showing the father's un-
fitness, for to not do so would allow the mother to still unilaterally
destroy some of the unwed father's rights.322 While the Supreme
Court cases have not been ultimately clear, they have made it clear
that such a result as that will not withstand judicial scrutiny.323
B. Impact on Scovell
Although unconstitutional for its failure to provide notice to fa-
thers who have registered their notice of intent to claim paternity, its
requirement that such fathers must establish their fitness and ability
316. Id. at 577, 385 N.W.2d at 451.
317. See id.
318. See id. at 577, 385 N.W.2d at 451, where the court states that under a strict
scrutiny analysis it must determine whether a less restrictive alternative to the
means employed by the Legislature will produce the same desired effect.
319. See supra notes 279-309 and accompanying text.
320. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104.06(1) (Reissue 1988).
321. Id.
322. NEB. Rev. STAT. § 43-104.06(2) (Reissue 1988).
323. See supra notes 48-134 and accompanying text.
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to parent, and its requirement that the father prevail in a best inter-
ests analysis, while requiring nothing of the mother, the Nebraska
adoption statutes did not deprive Ronald Scovell of any constitutional
rights. Scovell failed to take advantage of the protections that the Ne-
braska statutes do afford. How, then, can he complain that the stat-
utes provided him too little protection? As the district court found:
Mr. Scovell has never asked to see Jorie Lyn, never requested visitation, and
has never offered to help pay for the medical bills incurred by her birth, or to
support her.32 4
Further, upon notice that Ms. Babb was pregnant, Scovell failed to
assert his parental rights in Nebraska or in any other state. He made
no inquiries about Babb's whereabouts and made no attempts to con-
tact her in anticipation of the child's birth. Clearly, this is no father
who has grasped his opportunity to establish a relationship with his
child. His complaint that Ms. Babb told him that she was going to
abort the pregnancy and that her family refused to assist him in con-
tacting her325 would carry more weight if he had, indeed, made efforts
to maintain contact with Ms. Babb, assert his rights, and show a com-
mitment to Jorie Lyn's future, rather than blame others for his failure
to make such attempts.
Because of Scovell's acts, or failure to act, his parental rights were
fairly terminated by the Nebraska courts. Although he failed to com-
ply with the statutory requirements, the Scheeles' adoption proceed-
ing was stayed while the court heard Scovell's plea. He was heard, he
was allowed to present his case, and the court determined that he had
failed to manifest sufficient interest in his child to merit protection by
the Constitution.
Developing a statutory scheme that will withstand constitutional
challenge, still, does not wholly resolve the problems presented. To be
effective, the availability and impact of the statutes must be publi-
cized.326 Because most courts will not hesitate to hold that ignorance
324. Scovell v. Scheele, No. 510-145 (Lancaster County Dist. Ct. July 18, 1994)(order
denying writ of habeas corpus).
325. See supra notes 1-25 and accompanying text.
326. See, for example, Oi.a. STAT. AN. tit. 10, § 55.1(G)(1-2) (West 1987), which spe-
cifically provides .that the Department of Human Services shall provide for the
statewide publication and distribution of information regarding the existence of
the registry, the proper procedures for entry and registration, and the conse-
quences of the failure to register.
Nebraska could learn a valuable lesson from Oklahoma's efforts to publicize
the existence of the registry. Upon visiting the Nebraska Department of Social
Services' Lincoln headquarters, not a single informational item regarding or even
mentioning the putative father registry was found among the Department's two
literature displays.
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of the law is no excuse,3 27 it is important that those affected by these
statutes be made aware of them. The statistics shown below provide
evidence that there are a frighteningly high number of people in
Nebraska who are ignorant of the putative father registry, and there-
fore, are likely to unwittingly forfeit their parental rights.328
# Births Timely Late
Year in Nebr. # Out-of-Wedlock # Adoptions Notices Notices 3 2 9
1993 23,196 5,431 977 19 4
1992 23,336 5,260 991 13 7
1991 23,947 5,144 973 12 6
IV. CONCLUSION
The nature of the family and the protection to which its many as-
pects are entitled have continued to evolve and expand, while the
courts wrestle with the issues discussed within this Note.330 Because
state law still controls when the issue of family relationships is
presented, a great responsibility falls on the state to establish efficient
and effective means to protect all members of and all relationships
within the family. As the Supreme Court and state court cases have
shown, the area of adoption law, and specifically, the area of unwed
fathers' rights is still unsettled. Nevertheless, it is well-settled that
notice to those who have taken affirmative steps to protect themselves
must be afforded before any liberty interest is taken. Nebraska ar-
gues that unwed father's rights will delay adoption proceedings and
insert instability and uncertainty into the adoptive home. However,
quite to the contrary, it is precisely because an unwed father is not
given notice in Nebraska that such instability and uncertainty is cre-
ated. This instability and uncertainty manifests itself in the potential
for future challenges to the adoption, based on denials of due process
and equal protection. Guaranteeing notice, rather than statutory pro-
cedural complexity, will ensure certainty, stability, and constitutional-
ity in the Nebraska adoption statutes.
Kevin T. Lytle '96
327. See, e.g., In re Reeves, 831 S.W.2d 607, 608 (Ark. 1992). See also Shoecraft v.
Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, Inc., 222 Neb. 574, 580, 385 N.W.2d 448, 452
(1986).
328. Statistics provided by the Nebraska State Court Administrator's Office and the
Nebraska Bureau of Health Data Services.
329. Notices filed after the five-day limit are also forwarded to the mother, so that she
is aware of the unwed father's interest in asserting his parental rights.
330. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). The Lehr Court observed that the
"intangible fibers that connect parent and child have infinite variety. They are
woven throughout the fabric of our society, providing it with strength, beauty,
and flexibility. It is self-evident that they are sufficiently vital to merit constitu-
tional protection in appropriate cases." Id. at 256.
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